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The concept of “the Establishment” 
and the transformation of political argument in Britain since 1945 
 
I 
 
It is well known that the term “the Establishment”, in something like the sense in which it is still 
used in political and colloquial speech, was coined by the journalist Henry Fairlie in September 
1955, in an article discussing the unmasking of the British spies Guy Burgess and Donald 
Maclean.1 It is almost equally well known—and Fairlie later pointed out—that this attribution is 
mistaken. 2  Fairlie himself had used the term repeatedly before his oft-cited article, and the 
historian A.J.P. Taylor had also already done so in 1953 in a sense broadly cognate with Radical 
polemic against “the classes” and “the THING”, William Cobbett’s term for the fiscal-military 
apparatus constructed during the Napoleonic Wars.3 Even then it was by no means a neologism: 
the biographer Hesketh Pearson and the journalist Malcolm Muggeridge had each independently 
used the term in 1936, and in 1928 the New Statesman referred to a group of writers including 
Kipling, Shaw and Wells as “Bishops […] of the literary Establishment”, a transitional sense of 
                                                 
1 Henry Fairlie, “Political Commentary”, Spectator 23 September 1955, 380. 
2 Idem, “Evolution of a Term”, New Yorker 19 October 1968, 184-7. 
3 A.J.P. Taylor, “Books in General”, New Statesman 29 August 1953, 236. 
 3 
the term in which a dependence upon its traditional ecclesiastical usage was still evident.4 These 
earlier usages also appear as modulations of an older way of referring to Estates, or to quasi-
permanent institutions of the state, that is familiar from Edmund Burke’s defence of 
“establishments” against the French Revolution, which included not only the Church but also “an 
established monarchy, an established aristocracy, and an established democracy.”5 
 If the concept was not entirely new in September 1955, however, the fact that it seemed so 
at that time is of considerable historical interest. “The Establishment” is now such a familiar part 
of everyday speech that its historical specificity—the fact that it fell into common use at a 
particular time and place, in which its novelty was widely remarked upon—is easily overlooked. 
This tendency has been compounded by its assimilation to the vocabulary of history and the social 
sciences, which was already underway in E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working 
Class (1963) and continued in sociological studies of elites in the 1970s and 1980s.6 Partly as a 
                                                 
4 Hesketh Pearson, Labby: The Life of Henry Labouchere (London, 1936), 259-60; Malcolm 
Muggeridge, “Men and Books”, Time and Tide 9 May 1936, 670-1, at 671; “Revaluations”, New 
Statesman 12 May 1928, 162-4, quotation at 162. 
5 Edmund Burke, “Reflections on the Revolution in France” (1790) in The Writings and Speeches 
of Edmund Burke, Vol. 8: The French Revolution, 1790-1794, ed. L.G. Mitchell & William B. 
Todd, (Oxford, 1989), 142. 
6 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London, 1963), 43, 59, 74, 137, 350, 
351, 396, 397, 402, 623, 726, 813; W.L. Guttsman, “The British political elite and the class 
structure” in Philip Stanworth & Anthony Giddens, eds., Elites and Power in British Society 
(Cambridge, 1974); John Scott, The Upper Classes: Property and Privilege in Britain (London, 
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result “the Establishment” is now commonly used, by historians of modern Britain and by scholars 
in a wide range of sub-fields, in a de-historicised and more-or-less colloquial sense to denote 
various forms of traditional authority, with a cohesive (yet frequently vague) social basis or ethos.7 
Even when the concept is recognised as an artefact of mid-1950s Britain, it is easily assumed to 
refer to something that actually existed, or to be indicative of contemporary attitudes towards such 
a thing (often in the context of a somewhat indistinct “decline of deference”).8 As well as adopting 
                                                 
1982), 96-110; also David Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New Haven, 
1990), xii & passim.  
7 In the former category, for example, Matt Houlbrook, Prince of Tricksters: The Incredible True 
Story of Netley Lucas, Gentleman Crook (Chicago and London, 2016), 10, 54, 104, 312, 320; 
Emily Robinson, The Language of Progressive Politics in Modern Britain (Basingstoke, 2017), 
125, 258; in the latter, Anthony Pagden, The Enlightenment: And Why It Still Matters (New York, 
2013), 172; Mark Greif, The Age of the Crisis of Man: Thought and Fiction in America, 1933-
1973 (Princeton & Oxford, 2015), 298. 
8 For example, Houlbrook, Prince of Tricksters, 67, 343; Robinson, Language of Progressive 
Politics, 13; James E. Cronin, The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in 
Twentieth-Century Britain (London/ New York, 1991), 229-30; Matthew Grant, “Historians, the 
Penguin Specials and the ‘State of the Nation’ Literature, 1958-64”, Contemporary British History 
17 (2003), 35-7; also the discussion of the concept in two major survey histories of post-war Britain: 
Kenneth O. Morgan, The People’s Peace: British History 1945-1989 (Oxford, 1990), 143, 396; 
and Kevin Jefferys, Retreat from New Jerusalem: British Politics, 1951-64 (Basingstoke, 1997), 
117-22. 
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the philosophically-questionable assumption that concepts used by historical subjects had fixed 
referents to which they self-evidently pointed, or with which they were somehow identical, this 
customary understanding of “the Establishment” drains it of the meanings with which it was 
invested in the mid-1950s, constraining the historian’s ability to “play the stranger” which, as has 
been suggested elsewhere, is crucial to the study of recent and contemporary history.9 
Furthermore, it excludes the concept itself from the field of historical inquiry. This is 
unfortunate because the relationship between power and authority, which “the Establishment” was 
used to discuss, was a central issue in mid-century British politics. One of the most influential 
recent histories of twentieth-century England states that “on the whole, those who had authority in 
1918 still had it, more or less, in 1951”, notwithstanding a reorientation of political economy 
towards the working class during the second world war.10 Political and social authority had been 
vigorously contested in Britain during that period, however, particularly from the late 1930s when 
the Daily Mirror began to construct a class-based populism counterposing the supposed wishes of 
“the people” concerning the possible abdication of Edward VIII to the machinations of a network 
centring on “The Church, the West End of London and the aristocracy”; and the idea of the 
“Cliveden Set” was formulated to denote an aristocratic cabal that had manipulated Britain’s 
foreign policy towards Nazi Germany. 11  That discursive challenge was sustained into the 
                                                 
9 Guy Ortolano, The Two Cultures Controversy: Science, Literature and Cultural Politics in 
Postwar Britain (Cambridge, 2009), 8.  
10 Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1951 (Oxford, 1998), v. 
11 Quoted in Adrian Bingham, “Representing the People? The Daily Mirror, class and political 
culture in inter-war Britain”, in Brave New World: Imperial and Democratic Nation-Building in 
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following decade by influential denunciations of the “Guilty Men” supposedly responsible for the 
failed policy of appeasement; and by the emergence of a climate of opinion in which criticism of 
“vested interests” became a common feature of political and popular speech.12 How far these terms 
accurately described the location or operation of power in Britain, or even reflected popular 
attitudes towards the institutions and people who wielded it, is not entirely clear. Although the war 
was accompanied by temporary crises of political authority in May 1940 and, perhaps, in the first 
half of 1942 when Stafford Cripps briefly appeared a credible alternative to Winston Churchill as 
prime minister, it was concluded without any thoroughgoing reconstruction of political elites in 
Britain, save for the partial incorporation of organised labour into the political nation which 
prominent Trades Union Congress (TUC) and Labour leaders proclaimed after 1945.13 Whether 
this latter development changed the fundamental location or nature of political authority in Britain 
or merely, in accordance with Ross McKibbin’s characterisation of the overall development of 
social relations by 1951, adjusted the terms on which authority was held, was a fundamental issue 
                                                 
Britain between the Wars, ed. Laura Beers and Geraint Thomas (London, 2012), 109-28, quotation 
at 121. On “the Cliveden Set” see Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set: Portrait of an Exclusive 
Fraternity (London, 2000), ch.8, esp. 178-80. 
12 ‘Cato’, Guilty Men (London, 1940); Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the 
Second World War (London, 1975), 131-3. 
13 On Cripps see Angus Calder, The People’s War: Britain, 1939-1945 (London, 1969), 270-5 and 
302; on the unions, Robert Taylor, The Trade Union Question in British Politics: Government and 
Unions since 1945 (London, 1993), 29-31. 
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in political debate during the 1950s, and one which the earliest usages of “the Establishment” were 
employed to contest.14  
This essay undertakes a partial historicisation of the idea of “the Establishment” with the 
aim of understanding how it helped to define the intellectual horizons of British politics within and 
between parties after 1945. Throughout this period the concept of “the Establishment” had neither 
a fixed referent nor even a consistent, clearly-defined meaning. Although Fairlie occasionally 
admonished users who departed from what he viewed as its proper usage, he himself used “the 
Establishment” in diverse and sometimes inconsistent senses, as we shall see; and almost all of its 
usages appear as no more than possible usages, which did not seek to assign to the concept a single, 
determinate meaning or referent that excluded all others. This historicisation of the concept is 
therefore congruent with recent tendencies in scholarship on modern Britain to assign greater 
autonomy to language in the formation of processes of political, social and economic change; and 
with a growing interest in what has been called the “intellectual setting” of political debate, which 
has been produced by a convergence of the so-called “new political history” with histories of “high” 
politics.15  This development has produced a more sensitive and flexible reading of political 
language than that offered by much of the new political history, which frequently relied upon a 
more conventional conception of the relationship between representation and “reality” than its 
                                                 
14 McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, v and 528-36. 
15 The phrase “intellectual setting” was used in Susan Pedersen, “What is political history now?”, 
in What is history now?, ed. David Cannadine  (London, 2002), 42; see also David M. Craig, 
“‘High Politics’ and the ‘New Political History’”, Historical Journal 53 (2010), 453-475.  
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exponents claimed.16 I wish to suggest here that following these developments can produce a richer 
and more precise account of the alignments that structured political argument in Britain after 1945. 
In order to trace the shifting “possible usages” of “the Establisment” in this way, this essay 
situates their formation and development within a transformation of political argument that was 
effected by the emergence of a new set of concepts which, besides “the Establishment”, also 
included “the welfare state” and, from 1958, “affluence” – both of which are also commonly 
assumed to have had determinate referents, but the recovery of whose conceptual usages is crucial 
to understanding British politics after 1945. It opens by demonstrating how “the Establishment” 
was re-coined in conservative political commentary, in a sense quite different from that in which 
it is now conventionally understood. A more pejorative usage emerged in debates within the 
Labour Party over the nature of the post-war polity and the party’s position within it, but this was 
directed at the Labour and trade union leaderships at least as much as at the Conservative 
government; and “the Establishment” continued to be used by conservative commentators with a 
positive evaluative force.  Partly as a result, it was eschewed by the Labour Party in the 1959 
election; but a modulation of political argument assigned considerable influence to the concept in 
constructions of political and economic conditions in Britain during the early 1960s, and thus 
enabled it to be used in a novel sense by Harold Wilson as Labour leader from February 1963. 
Finally, the article examines how “the Establishment” helped to structure political action and 
alignments in Britain after Wilson’s first government (1964-66), and its assimilation to the politics 
                                                 
16 A similar point has been made in Dror Wahrman, ‘The New Political History: A Review Essay’, 
Social History 21 (1996), 343-354; and in Stuart Middleton, “‘Affluence’ and the Left in Britain, 
c.1958-1974”, English Historical Review CXXIX (2014), 107-138, at 107-10. 
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of Thatcherism during the 1970s. By this time a transition in British political debate had taken 
place which evolving usages of “the Establishment” both reflected and helped to accomplish, 
whereby the appeal that Wilson had articulated during the mid-1960s was placed outside the scope 
of Labour politics; and the ideal of conservative government that, in its original re-coinage, “the 
Establishment” had served to promote was marginalised within the Conservative Party, partly 
through the use of that concept itself. 
 
II 
 
The idea of “the Establishment” was re-coined amid an intellectual revival of conservatism in post-
war Britain, the leading exponents of which included the political philosopher Michael Oakeshott 
and the journalist T.E. Utley, whose work registered the prominence of questions of power and 
authority in political argument during the mid-1950s.17 A major forum for this intellectual culture 
was provided by The Spectator, reinvigorated under Ian Gilmour’s ownership from 1954 when 
Henry Fairlie also began writing its “Political Commentary” column. The strongest emphases in 
Fairlie’s writing fell upon an organic conception of society and the state, and upon a conventionally 
conservative understanding of politics as the play and resolution of contending interests and 
opinions.18 This play of interest and opinion, he claimed in September 1953, had been restricted 
                                                 
17 [T.E. Utley,] “Power”, Times Literary Supplement 12 October 1956, 601. 
18 For example (respectively), Henry Fairlie, “Old Intellectuals Never Die…”, Spectator 3 June 
1955, 709-10; idem, “Political Commentary”, Spectator 29 July 1955, 156. 
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in modern Britain by the stability of “the political and religious Establishments” of 1688.19 Fairlie 
went on to develop a distinctive sense of “the Establishment” to connote this constraint of politics, 
usually as a result of collusion between party leaderships in a manner which he may have intended 
to echo eighteenth-century “country” opposition to the court. At the end of 1954, anticipating the 
next general election, he complained that “the Butskells on both sides will be fighting a mock 
battle with each other”,20 the outcome of which was unimportant because: 
 
The two parties have become equal partners in the Establishment. The evidence is there in 
the debates of 1954. On none of the major issues […] did the front benches, and their 
faithful retainers on the benches behind them, differ. It was only from the despised in the 
two parties, the eccentric Conservatives who still believe in Conservatism and the lunatic 
Socialists who still believe in Socialism, that the prevailing, flattening, deadening 
orthodoxy was challenged.21 
 
Here “the Establishment” was a long-standing political settlement the effects of which were 
intensified by “Butskellism”, the term recently popularised by The Economist to indicate the 
political constraints on economic policy that operated on government and opposition parties 
alike. 22  Fairlie developed this sense of the term in an article criticising the impotence of 
                                                 
19 Idem, “Dean Inge and England”, Spectator 25 September 1953, 332-3 (quotation at 332). 
20 Idem, “Political Commentary”, Spectator 31 December 1954, 818. 
21 Ibid., 819. 
22 “Mr Butskell’s Dilemma”, Economist 13 February 1954, 439-41. 
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contemporary political journalism, which he related to the fact that “The Establishment has now 
extended itself far beyond Crown, Church and Parliament” and “includes—amongst other 
institutions—the press.”— 
 
The press today is largely owned by people who are high-ranking members of the 
Establishment. Whatever the differences between individual papers, there is one 
resemblance between them which is far more important. They all wish to preserve the 
‘moderate’ Conservatives and the ‘moderate’ Socialists. They are all cast in the ‘front-
bench’ frame of mind.23  
 
These bodies of moderate opinion, Fairlie continued, “are both primarily interested in maintaining 
the status quo, in shoring up the Establishment” – obstructing the free play of “interests and ideas” 
which he conceived as the proper activity of politics.24 He had previously argued that such an 
obstruction could lead to a weakening of political order, in an article criticising what he claimed 
was a growing separation between British society and its “governing élite” such that the latter 
“have no common bond but their professional interest and are without social cohesion, without 
social continuity.”25 In response to criticism of this earlier article, Fairlie claimed to have been 
concerned specifically with the working class, which had recently gained power in Britain—in 
what he repeatedly called a “revolution” wrought by the Attlee governments—but which could not 
                                                 
23 Henry Fairlie, “Political Commentary”, Spectator 29 July 1955, 156. 
24 Ibid., 156. 
25 Idem, “True Conservatism”, Spectator 22 October 1954, 485-6 (quotation at 485). 
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recognise its own leaders, who adopted “a status, a manner of living, which is not that of the 
working classes.”26 This did, however, suggest greater cohesion among the “governing élite” than 
Fairlie had previously allowed, and that suggestion was developed in his analysis of the Burgess-
Maclean affair the following year, in which he was (and has since been) widely believed to have 
coined “the Establishment.”  
In September 1955 the Foreign Office confirmed that the diplomats Guy Burgess and 
Donald Maclean, who had disappeared in 1951, had been Soviet agents and were now living in the 
U.S.S.R.. Amid the ensuing opprobrium Fairlie argued that the episode, and particularly the 
mobilisation of elite opinion in defence of the men after their disappearance, was indicative of how 
power was exercised in post-war Britain. “I have several times suggested that what I call the 
‘Establishment’ in this country is today more powerful than ever before”, he declared, and the 
Burgess-Maclean affair was a case study of its modus operandi: 
 
By the ‘Establishment’ I do not mean only the centres of official power—though they are 
certainly part of it—but rather the whole matrix of official and social relations within which 
                                                 
26 Idem, “True Conservatism” (letter), Spectator 5 November 1954, 546. Fairlie referred to the 
“revolution” that he believed had taken place in 1945 in “Political Commentary”, Spectator 14 
January 1955, 32; “Political Commentary”, Spectator 29 April 1955, 524-5; “Political 
Commentary”, Spectator 10 June 1955, 724-5; “Political Commentary”, Spectator 28 October 
1955, 543-4. 
 13 
power is exercised. The exercise of power in Britain (more specifically, in England) cannot 
be understood unless it is recognised that it is exercised socially.27 
 
Fairlie’s article prompted a spirited correspondence in The Spectator, much of it occupied by 
people he had identified as members of “the Establishment” indignantly contesting his analysis 
and what they took to be the implication of wrongdoing on their part. In reply, Fairlie protested 
that “I believe that it is desirable that something like the ‘Establishment’ should exist, because it 
prevents even worse influences from operating.”28 In this latest sense Fairlie appears to have meant 
by “the Establishment” something like “the pleasing illusions” which Burke believed harmonised 
the social organism with the institutions of government, in contrast with the liberal or  “mechanic 
philosophy” of revolutionary France under which the force of law was merely coercive.29  It 
conveyed a sense of the unification of power and authority in post-war Britain; but also of the 
instability of that union, insofar as he had previously argued that the incorporation of labour leaders 
into this “matrix of official and social relations” jeopardised the recognition of authority by the 
working class. 
Fairlie’s claim that “the Establishment” was “more powerful than ever before”, and his 
concern over the working class’s recognition of political authority, implied that the term denoted 
a configuration of power relations the composition of which had been altered by the accession to 
it of organised labour; but the fundamental character of which remained unchanged. The 
                                                 
27 Henry Fairlie, “Political Commentary” (cited above at n.1), 380. 
28 Idem, “Political Commentary”, Spectator 7 October 1955, 436. 
29 Burke, “Reflections”, 128-9. 
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circumstances of the term’s re-coinage amid the Burgess and Maclean affair evoked the 
accusations of ruling-class treachery that “the Cliveden Set” and “Guilty Men” had been used to 
formulate during the 1930s and 1940s; and in the ensuing correspondence in The Spectator, “the 
Establishment” was retrospectively applied to the networks of political and intellectual opinion 
that promoted appeasement during the 1930s, and to earlier episodes in British political history.30 
At this point, therefore, “the Establishment” was not obviously part of a novel dispensation in 
political argument, but rather appears to have occupied the conceptual co-ordinates within which 
the legitimacy of political authority in Britain had been questioned over the previous two decades. 
The same was true of its usage amid the denouement of Princess Margaret’s relationship with the 
courtier Peter Townsend a month after Fairlie’s article on the Burgess-Maclean affair, in which 
the alleged involvement of the Archbishop of Canterbury in dissuading Margaret from marriage 
prompted calls for the dis-establishment of the Anglican Church.31 In this context, criticism of the 
ecclesiastical Establishment was readily extended to wider criticisms of the structure and exercise 
of power in Britain, and to claims that they were at variance with the wishes of “the people”: a 
usage consistent with the class-based populism propagated by the Daily Mirror during the 
                                                 
30 Robert Boothby, “‘The Establishment’” (letter), Spectator 7 October 1955, 448; Henry Fairlie, 
“Political Commentary: How Guilty Were The Guilty Men?”, Spectator 2 December 1955, 758-
60; “Writer to the Establishment”, The Economist 3 December 1955, 838. 
31 See, for example, “Princess Margaret”, Sunday Times 16 October 1955, 8; “Opinion: Double 
Trouble”, Daily Express 31 October 1955, 4; “Appeal for Church Freedom”, Times 14 November 
1955, 6. 
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abdication crisis of 1936.32 On 4 November 1955 the Daily Express carried a letter signed by 
twelve self-described “young” men—including the filmmaker Lindsay Anderson, the musician 
Humphrey Lyttelton, and the theatre critic Kenneth Tynan—claiming that the episode “has brought 
to a head the unease which we and many members of the younger generation have been feeling 
about the administration of the country since the war”, a major element of which was that “it has 
shown us ‘the Establishment’ in full cry, that pious group of potentates who so loudly applauded 
the Princess’s decision.”33 Fairlie and Anderson disputed whether this was a proper use of “the 
Establishment”;34 but hereafter the term appears to have been rapidly assimilated to ordinary, if 
not yet popular, speech, so that the New Statesman, for example, could refer to Harold Macmillan’s 
views during the 1930s as having brought upon him “the bitter hatred of the Establishment” within 
the Conservative Party.35 It was sufficiently recognisable for The Spectator to include a spoof 
“Establishment Game” in its Christmas 1955 issue; and in January 1956 the magazine’s columnist 
“Pharos” remarked, “I see that the new sense of the word ‘Establishment’ is now becoming quite 
                                                 
32 “‘The Times’ and Monarchy”, New Statesman 29 October 1955, 528; Michael Foot, “The 
Royalty Racket”, Tribune 4 November 1955, 10; Bingham, “Representing the People?”. 
33 “Letters: What people in high places forget”, Daily Express 4 November 1955, 4. 
34 Henry Fairlie, “Political Commentary”, Spectator 11 November 1955, 608; Lindsay Anderson, 
“Undesirable Emigrants” (letter), Spectator 18 November 1955, 650-1; Henry Fairlie, “Political 
Commentary”, Spectator 18 November 1955, 636-7 (at 637). 
35 “Keeper of Their Conscience”, New Statesman 5 November 1955, 570. See also, for example, 
“Writer to the Establishment”, Economist 3 December 1955, 838.  
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respectable”, after the radical clergyman John Collins used it in St. Paul’s to denote a configuration 
of institutions from which the church ought to extract itself in order to preserve its integrity.36 
 
III 
 
Within twelve months of Fairlie’s first re-coining of the term, therefore, “the Establishment” had 
acquired two different (and inconsistent) senses from his usage along with other, pejorative 
meanings that renewed the discursive template within which a latent antagonism between “the 
people” and a socially-defined political elite had been constructed since the late 1930s. (Even the 
“young men” dismayed by the conclusion of the Margaret-Townsend affair used the term to signify 
the intensification of a tension between an (implicitly old) “Establishment” and themselves as self-
designated representatives of a new post-war generation – not the emergence of a novel condition 
or social formation.) From early 1956 the term also began to be assimilated to debates within the 
Labour Party over the course of recent political and economic change, in which widespread 
discussion of a global transition from capitalism to “managerialism” was joined by divergent 
accounts of the nature and extent of the welfare reforms of the 1940s in Britain.37 Since the later 
                                                 
36 “The Establishment Game: How to Get on Without Actually Doing Anything”, Spectator 23 
December 1955, 866-7; “Pharos”, “A Spectator’s Notebook”, Spectator 20 January 1956, 71. 
37 On discussions of “managerialism”, see Stephen Brooke, “Atlantic Crossing? American Views 
of Capitalism and British Socialist Thought 1932-1962”, Twentieth Century British History 2 
(1991), 115-17. Contending interpretations of managerialism formed one of the major fault-lines 
in the influential New Fabian Essays of 1952: see R.H.S. Crossman, “Towards a Philosophy of 
 17 
1940s it had become commonplace to refer to those reforms as having created a “welfare state”, a 
concept whose usage could imply that Labour (as the principal reforming agent) had been 
incorporated into the political nation, in contrast to the dominant representation of it in inter-war 
political culture.38 After the party’s return to opposition in 1951 this supposed change in Labour’s 
relationship to the polity was associated with descriptions of it as an “alternative government” – a 
long-used phrase that acquired new meanings within and outside the party to validate calls for 
discipline or “responsibility”, by reference to a supposedly new political dispensation.39 In the 
extension of these discussions beyond 1955 it became increasingly common to refer to the changed 
                                                 
Socialism” in Crossman, ed., New Fabian Essays (London, 1952), 10-11 (quotations at 10); C.A.R. 
Crosland, “The Transition from Capitalism”, ibid., 38-9; 44. 
38 Ross McKibbin, “Class and Conventional Wisdom: The Conservative Party and the ‘Public’ in 
Inter-war Britain”, in McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880-1950 
(Oxford, 1990); and David Jarvis, “British Conservatism and Class Politics in the 1920s”, English 
Historical Review CXI (1996), 59-84. 
39 Outside the party, the phrase was particularly favoured (in exhortatory mode) in The Times: see 
for example the editorials “Labour Thinking”, The Times 27 June 1952, 7; “Mr. Bevan’s 
Pronouncement”, The Times 16 October 1952, 7; “A Sorry Affair”, The Times 30 January 1953, 7; 
“Need for a Policy”, The Times 5 March 1953, 9; “Substitutes for a Policy”, The Times 17 June 
1953, 7. Within the party, see “The Duty of an Opposition: Mr. Morrison’s Call for Party Unity”, 
The Times 27 October 1952, 2; “Labour and Conservative Attacks on Mr. Bevan”, The Times 7 
March 1955, 6. 
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position of the Labour Party within a transformed polity by describing it as part of “the 
Establishment.”40  
However, the nature of the political dispensation that had emerged from the 1940s 
continued to be contested in political discourse, and “the Establishment” could accordingly be used 
in more than one sense. In particular, among those for whom “the welfare state” denoted only a 
limited and incomplete set of reforms, the identification of Labour with “the Establishment” could 
suggest that its proper objectives had been compromised or frustrated in its encounter with 
traditional centres and practices of power in the British political system.41 This latter usage was 
facilitated by Robert McKenzie’s celebrated study British Political Parties (1955), which claimed 
that the distribution of power within the Conservative and Labour parties was “overwhelmingly 
similar” and that in both cases it effectively maintained the predominance of the leadership over 
the parliamentary party and wider party membership.42 Thus when Aneurin Bevan, for example, 
gave a speech in February 1956 criticising the management of the Parliamentary Labour Party, he 
evoked a rich set of associations in contemporary political culture which the New Statesman 
                                                 
40 For example, Tom Burns, “The Cold Class War”, New Statesman 7 April 1956, 330-1 (at 330); 
R.H.S. Crossman, “Changing the Climate of Opinion”, New Statesman 12 May 1956, 526-8; A.J.P. 
Taylor, “The Way We Live Now”, New Statesman 8 September 1956, 288-9. 
41 For example in Peter Townsend, “A Society for People” in Norman MacKenzie, ed., Conviction 
(London, 1958), 108; also Dennis Potter, “Base Ingratitude?”, New Statesman 3 May 1958, 560-
2; E.P. Thompson, ‘At the Point of Decay’, in Thompson ed., Out of Apathy (London, 1960), 9. 
42 R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative 
and Labour Parties (London, 1955), 582, 590. 
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recognised as a challenge to “the Labour Party establishment.”43 Bevan himself followed the 
speech with an article complaining of “the blurring of the demarcation lines between the parties” 
and warning that “if the progressive party is to succeed it must challenge the assumptions […] on 
which the existing pattern of society is based” – a statement which aligned the leaderships of the 
Labour and Conservative Parties in a sense consistent with Fairlie’s first re-coining of “the 
Establishment”, but which was based on a radically different understanding of what Bevan called 
“the existing pattern of society.” (As we saw, Fairlie had characterised the reforms of the 1940 as 
a “revolution”, but Bevan—one of their principal architects—regarded them as incomplete, or 
liable to reversal).44 In another speech later in the year, Bevan could therefore counterpose “the 
party establishment” to the “socialism” for which Labour supposedly stood.45 
 This claim that a vaguely-defined “socialism” was frustrated or obstructed by the operation 
of power in Britain was also extended to criticisms, by Labour politicians, of what they took to be 
the trade union leadership’s incorporation into what Bevan had called “the existing pattern of 
society.” In December 1955 a major article in the New Statesman bemoaned “the political vacuum 
created by the welfare state”, in which “A handful of trade union leaders and Old Etonians settle 
major issues of policy behind closed doors.”46 This was one element of an anti-democratic power 
nexus that the author called “the Hydra”, the composition of which was markedly similar to what 
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Fairlie had recently termed “the Establishment” but which placed a stronger emphasis upon the 
presence, “lurking in the background”, of “those ultimate horrors, the dark Tudor figure of Lord 
Salisbury and the composite T.U.C. monster.” 47  (Fairlie himself responded to the article by 
identifying “the Hydra” with “the Establishment”, but denying the suggestion that it was at odds 
with public opinion.)48 In 1956 the Labour politician and journalist Richard Crossman claimed that 
in post-war Britain the “State bureaucracy” and the trade unions were major components of a new 
managerialist economy: the unions, he claimed, “have now become established institutions, with 
deep roots in the existing social order, and display for this reason a quite natural reluctance to 
accept any radical change which seems inimical to their own interests.”49 His call for a renewed 
commitment to democracy in Labour politics was echoed in Tribune, which was routinely critical 
of union leaders’ accommodation with what its editor called “the British ruling class”, and 
proclaimed itself a champion of “militant, democratic trade unionism” centred on the shop floor.50 
 The identification of socialism with democracy, and the counterposition of those terms to 
a network of power that pursued its own interests without any democratic sanction, became a more 
marked feature of Labour rhetoric during the Suez affair, when Gaitskell’s opposition to the 
Government provided his internal critics with an opportunity to situate Labour outside the 
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predominant structures and practices of power in Britain, and thus to stake out the ground of party 
unity away from revisionism. On 28 September 1956, for example, as British threats of military 
action intensified, Bevan declared that the incipient conflict manifested a “transition” in Britain 
that was accomplishing “a break with the past”, and that “The trouble with the Tories is that they 
refuse to admit this. In domestic as in foreign affairs they have conformed to all the assumptions, 
policies and conventions of the Establishment.”51 Similarly, the manner in which Anthony Eden 
was eventually succeeded as prime minister by Harold Macmillan in January 1957—the 
penultimate occasion on which a British premier emerged from clandestine soundings among 
leading Conservative politicians—was presented as an affront to democracy in Tribune and the 
New Statesman, with Bevan, again, taking particular exception to the covert influence supposedly 
exercised by the Marquess of Salisbury as a representative of “the Establishment”.52 Macmillan’s 
accession to the Premiership was therefore used to help secure the populist usage of “the 
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Establishment” that had emerged over 1956-7 among Labour critics of revisionism, in which it 
referred to an antiquated ruling class that obstructed the interests and wishes of “democracy” – 
which were taken to be identical with the desire of the Labour “left” to move beyond the 
institutions and policies denoted by “the welfare state” to a broader (often vaguely-defined) 
programme of socialist reform. The argument that such a programme of reform was still necessary 
was seemingly validated in a speech given by Macmillan in March 1957, contrasting “the 
opportunity state” to the welfare state and promising to free the economy from the constraints of 
nationalisation.53 Although the pattern of Conservative welfare policy over the following seven 
years generally involved what Rodney Lowe characterises as “initial […] hostile scrutiny” 
followed by effective extension of provision in many areas, Macmillan’s counterposition of “the 
opportunity state” to the “welfare state” was seized upon by Bevan and others in the party, as an 
indication that even the limited reforms denoted by the latter term were under threat.54 
The new usage of “the Establishment” to denote a network of power centring on the 
Conservative Party that had successfully constrained or frustrated the Attlee governments, and to 
signify the Labour leadership’s complicity in a cross-party formation of opinion that obstructed 
further radical reform, became particularly distinctive among the grouping that Ben Pimlott 
identified as the Labour “Centre Left”, critical of Gaitskell’s leadership but distant from Bevan, 
whose leading figures were Harold Wilson and Richard Crossman and whose positions broadly 
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aligned with the editorial tendency of the New Statesman. 55  “The Establishment” featured 
prominently in Wilson’s critiques of British economic performance, as a pattern of conventional 
economic opinion to which the Government was supposedly in thrall; and the economist Thomas 
Balogh adopted the term to link Britain’s post-war economic performance with what he claimed 
was a gentlemanly amateurism in the ethos and personnel of the British state.56 (Wilson and 
Balogh’s criticisms of economic performance were also facilitated by the availability of new 
methods of economic measurement that helped to construct narratives of “decline” from the late 
1950s.)57 In November 1957 a New Statesman editorial on proposals to reform the House of Lords 
urged that “Labour […] should hesitate a long time before accepting any formula which provides 
further comfort to the Establishment”, because: 
 
One of the most astonishing and disturbing phenomena of post-war Britain is the resiliency 
of the class system, despite the progressive lowering of the economic barriers which 
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created it. Labour has signally failed to break down the hierarchical structure of British 
society because it has hesitated to tamper with the foundations on which it is built: the 
monarchy, the Lords and the public schools. […] Lords reform, therefore, is much more 
than a minor constitutional issue; it is a test of Labour’s faltering claim to represent the 
progressive and radical forces of the nation.58 
 
This usage may also have drawn some credibility from two controversial essays on the monarchy 
in mid-1957, by Lord Altrincham and by Malcolm Muggeridge, suggesting in different ways that 
the institution had become outmoded due to the influence of senior courtiers.59 A similar argument 
was also advanced by J.B. Priestley under the rubric of “Topside”, his near-synonym for “the 
Establishment” which he defined as “the reaction against a revolution that never happened” – that 
is, the successful resistance of traditional centres of power to the incomplete reforms of the Attlee 
governments.60 (Priestley attempted to distinguish his new coinage from “the Establishment”, on 
the grounds that “It’s newer than the establishment and has replaced it”; but the equivalence of the 
two terms was recognised by at least one reviewer, and Priestley abandoned the distinction in his 
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subsequent journalism.)61 The implication of the Labour leadership in these critical usages of “the 
Establishment” was facilitated by the launch of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1958, 
which was customarily presented as an anti-“Establishment” movement, and by Gaitskell’s 
resistance to unilateral disarmament.62 Indeed, Bevan himself could be brought within this sense 
of “the Establishment” after he affirmed his support for British nuclear weapons at the Labour 
conference in 1957, although he continued to use it as a term of abuse.63 
 
IV 
 
These usages of “the Establishment”, particularly in Wilson and Balogh’s criticisms of Britain’s 
post-war economic performance, prefigured the pattern of argument in which outmoded cultural 
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values and assumptions were held to be constraining Britain’s political and economic institutions, 
which became a prominent feature of public discourse during the early 1960s.64 This did not, 
however, originate as a response to the actual emergence or renewed predominance of any 
identifiable group, or set of beliefs and practices, to which “the Establishment” self-evidently 
referred. Attempts by, for example, the incipient “New Left” to assemble empirical evidence that 
the power of business, political and social elites had become more integrated and extensive after 
the war was met by empirical evidence, assembled by the Labour revisionist Anthony Crosland, 
that it had not.65 Nor were they demonstrably indicative of shifts in wider political or cultural 
opinion, or in public opinion at large. For example, public discussion of the “angry young man” 
supposedly personified in John Osborne’s play Look Back in Anger, which premiered in May 1956, 
has been presented as emerging from “a wave of anti-establishment writing” during the mid- and 
late-1950s.66 The idea of the “Angry Young Man” had been foreshadowed in 1955, in the letter 
signed by twelve “young men” expressing their dismay at the interference of “the Establishment” 
in the Princess Margaret affair. The hostility towards a vaguely-defined “Establishment” of some 
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of the writers customarily identified as “angry young men” was also evident in the much-discussed 
1957 symposium Declaration; and the congruence of these attitudes with the critical usages that 
were being developed within the Labour Party was seemingly confirmed in the journalist Kenneth 
Allsop’s book The Angry Decade (1958), which claimed that “the central spectacle of our broken-
winded economy is the extraordinarily stubborn effort that has been made in the Fifties to revive 
the meaningful panoply of the pre-war Establishment.”67 
 Yet the emergence of the “angry young man” as a subject of wide public discussion did 
not straightforwardly reinforce the pejorative usages of “the Establishment” that some in the 
Labour Party were developing during the mid- and late 1950s. Blake Morrison has observed of the 
“Movement” writers, several of whom (including Kingsley Amis and John Wain) were also 
commonly identified among the “angry young men”, that they occupied “an ambivalent position” 
towards structural inequality and the institutions of traditional authority in post-war Britain: “on 
the one hand opposed to the ‘old order’; on the other hand, indebted to, and respectful towards, its 
institutions”, to the “values” of which they continued to subscribe.68 A Times editorial of May 
1956 which helped to popularise the idea of the “angry young man” actually concluded that, contra 
the impression that might be gained from Osborne or Amis’s work, “the young sometimes put on 
almost too serious a face” and that rather than in the work of either of those contemporary writers, 
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“it is likelier that the real tone of our age will be found much closer to that of a century ago […] it 
is only a matter of time before the evil old men of the day flinch uneasily from the stare of some 
youthful Thomas Arnold.”69 One such, perhaps, was John Wain, who wrote in March 1957 (in an 
article disclaiming his identity as an “angry young man”) that, amid the cultural disinheritance 
visited upon the working class by industrialism and mass culture, “the Establishment” (which he 
defined as “a network of men from the right schools and colleges, belonging to the right clubs and 
married to the right sort of wives […] within which all effective decisions are made”) represented 
a locus of continuity in national culture, which should be maintained and reformed only “slowly 
and cautiously.”70 
This use of “the Establishment” with a positive evaluative force was not unusual in the late 
1950s. Indeed A.J.P. Taylor, who had used “the Establishment” in a pejorative sense shortly before 
Fairlie was believed to have re-coined the term, actually argued in October 1957 that it should be 
abandoned in favour of Cobbett’s “THE THING”, because “The very word […] tempts us to 
acknowledge the moral superiority of ‘the Establishment’”.71 That pejorative senses of the term 
were not its only, nor even perhaps its predominant, usages is confirmed by its employment in the 
work of conservative commentators. Fairlie, for example, claimed in a review of C. Wright Mills’s 
much-discussed book The Power Elite in 1956 that “The Establishment” was a desirable ethical 
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safeguard against the commercial “power elite” and public opinion; and in 1958 the journal of the 
Conservative Party’s newly-formed Bow Group, Crossbow, carried an article by the journalist 
Christopher Johnson numbering “the Establishment” (in contradistinction to “Utopia”) among the 
defining principles of conservatism, which Johnson largely endorsed despite their being sometimes 
misunderstood and misapplied.72 A more developed use of “the Establishment” in this sense 
appeared in an article by T.E. Utley in the first issue of Crossbow, which presented an account of 
post-war political history almost directly opposed to that which we have seen was propounded by 
the Labour “centre-left.”73 Like Fairlie, Utley claimed that the Attlee governments had produced 
a radically altered political dispensation comprising full employment and universal social services, 
which required a kind of stabilisation through which they would become “established 
institutions.”74 That stabilisation Utley conceived as the proper task of conservative government: 
the previous year he had published a vindication of Anthony Eden in terms of “what is roughly 
called Burkian [sic] Conservatism”, crediting him with moderating the reforms of the Attlee 
governments whilst avoiding the opposite extreme of laissez-faire economics.75 (This ideal of 
conservative government may also have been influenced by the French political philosopher 
Bertrand de Jouvenel’s theory of sovereignty, which distinguished between the rule of the dux, 
“who leads into action a stream of wills”, and that of the rex, “who regularises or rules” and upon 
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whom depends the “lasting aggregation” of the accomplishments of the dux: Jouvenel’s book was 
rapturously reviewed by Utley himself and by Michael Oakeshott upon its appearance in English 
in 1957.)76 Utley’s call for the creation of “established institutions” was particularly directed at 
“the trade union movement”, which he suggested had been pursuing the interests of its members 
and not of the “nation” as a whole.77 Elsewhere at this time Utley also claimed that the unions were 
now part of what he called “an establishment”, but that this larger formation was faced with the 
urgent task of conciliating middle-class workers “whose interests have been disproportionately 
sacrificed as the price of a compromise with organized labour”: in other words, the unions were 
part of an “Establishment” which they were preventing from acting as Utley believed 
establishments, in the proper sense, should.78 
 Utley’s claim that the unions had yet to become proper “establishments” in this sense was 
widely echoed among conservative commentators in the late 1950s.79 (“[W]hat we have to do”, 
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one Bow Group member mused in 1960, “is to make them even more a part of the establishment 
than they are already.”)80 This may have registered a tension, to which Robert Taylor has called 
attention, within the unions themselves, between leaderships’ belief that the unions had assumed 
a permanent role in national economic management, and the attitudes of local officials such as the 
one who told the sociologist Ferdynand Zweig in 1952: “Our movement is basically a sectionalist 
movement for the benefit of small sectionalist interests […] It is all right having the national 
interest in mind but we are not the right people to have it.”81 Nonetheless, collaboration between 
government and the unions was maintained during the early 1950s, primarily through close 
personal contacts between union leaders and the Minister of Labour, Sir Walter Monckton – which, 
as we have seen, alarmed some Labour figures who viewed the unions as part of a politically-
constraining post-war “Establishment.”82 Frank Cousins’s election as general secretary of the 
Transport and General Workers’ Union in 1956 made it more difficult for the unions to be 
identified en bloc with the “Establishment” in this sense, as he challenged not only the mutual 
restraint of government-union relations but also the Labour leadership in a series of confrontations 
over party democracy.83 However, this alteration in the temper of T.U.C. politics also tended to 
vindicate criticisms of the inherently sectional activities of the unions, which in conservative usage 
remained un- or incompletely “established”, exacerbating Labour’s difficulties in demonstrating 
its capacity to reconcile national and sectional interests. 
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Those difficulties may partly explain why a call by the New Statesman for Labour to 
present itself as “the party of outrage and challenge and change” in the 1959 election went 
unheeded.84 The party also remained deeply implicated in usages of “the Establishment” that 
referred to the polity and political economy established during the 1940s, and it was therefore not 
the only plausible exponent of “radical” politics.85 Indeed the purchase of the term, in the quasi-
populist senses employed by Labour critics of revisionism, beyond the circles of political rhetoric 
and commentary remained highly questionable. “Do you assume that young people dislike the 
Establishment?”, the journalist Norman MacKenzie inquired in the light of a Gallup poll in June 
1959: “Then consider how many have a ‘good’ or ‘fairly good’ opinion of such of its branches as 
the royal family, the Church of England, the armed forces and the big corporations: all score well 
over 50 per cent.”86 Recent re-examination of sociological surveys from the early 1960s has 
indicated a perception among working-class respondents of a natural distinction between a 
majority of “ordinary” individuals and a distant elite whose position was thus likewise naturalised, 
and which could therefore appear as a legitimate object of deference.87 Similar attitudes were 
found in a study of working-class Conservative voters in Stevenage published in New Left  Review 
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immediately after the 1959 election, which identified a pattern of “deference” to traditional and 
business elites associated with the Conservative Party.88 
In any case, the ambiguity of “the Establishment” in 1959 was not conducive to its adoption 
in the major parties’ electoral appeals. In August that year the Spectator issued its own critique of 
“the Establishment”, in the sense of what it called “an oligarchy of opinion, both pervasive and 
influential” which supposedly produced a stifling conformism in political culture.89 The term’s 
fluidity was also evident in Hugh Thomas’s symposium The Establishment (1959), which is often 
cited as though it was straightforwardly critical of something to which the concept of “the 
Establishment” referred.90 Yet alongside essays by Balogh, Fairlie and the Spectator’s literary 
critic Simon Raven each elaborating different pejorative definitions of the term (in Fairlie’s case, 
contra his previous insistence that it held no such force), the book included another by the former 
Conservative MP Christopher Hollis, who regretted that “the Establishment” in the sense of “some 
mysterious, social influence […] which really controls our destinies” did not have a more palpable 
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existence.91 The relative novelty, and instability, of the term was also apparent in its outright 
rejection by some commentators.92 In the 1959 election it was the Liberal Party, rejuvenated since 
1956 under Jo Grimond’s leadership, that came closest to articulating an anti-“Establishment” 
appeal: its manifesto derided “Tory bigwigs” and “Labour bosses” in the same register, and 
claimed that Labour’s financing by “the vested interests of the Trade Union establishment” 
precluded it from becoming a properly “progressive party.” 93  After the poll, in which the 
Conservative majority was increased to 100, the New Statesman acknowledged that it had been 
criticism of the apparatus and institutions of the state created by Labour that had been most telling 
in the campaign.94 
 
V 
 
The ambiguity of the concept of “the Establishment” was initially maintained in the debates that 
followed the election, which extended those of the previous decade over Labour’s relation to the 
post-war polity. However, over the course of those debates “the Establishment” was situated more 
firmly within a distinctively contemporary conceptual vocabulary, in which it acquired the 
                                                 
91 Henry Fairlie, “The B.B.C.” in Thomas, ed., The Establishment, 191-208; Simon Raven, “Perish 
by the Sword”, ibid., 49-79; Christopher Hollis, “Parliament and the Establishment”, ibid., 187. 
92 Alasdair Macintyre, “The Straw Man of the Age”, New Statesman 3 October 1959, 434; T.R. 
Fyvel, “The B.B.C. Image”, Encounter December 1959, 56. 
93 F.W.S. Craig, British General Election Manifestos 1918-1966 (Chichester, 1970), 207. 
94 “The Labour Inquest”, New Statesman 17 October 1959, 493.  
 35 
meanings that enabled it to be deployed in the political appeal that Harold Wilson articulated 
before the 1964 election amid wider discursive constructions of a crisis of traditional authority in 
Britain. Firstly, the post-1959 debates received a new emphasis from the adoption of the concept 
of “affluence” from J.K. Galbraith’s The Affluent Society (1958), which Richard Crossman used 
to suggest that post-war capitalism, and thus the requirement for Labour to present itself as a 
radical “anti-Establishment party” rather than “a staid Alternative Government”, remained 
unchanged.95 Gaitskell’s critics accordingly continued to use “the Establishment” to characterise 
his leadership as oligarchic and anti-democratic, and to indicate his failure to articulate a distinctive, 
radical policy (the precise content of which was, as before, often somewhat vague).96 Meanwhile 
Anthony Crosland, the leading theorist of Labour “revisionism”, strenuously rebutted New Left 
analyses of power in post-war Britain and used “affluence” to denote a transformation of capitalism 
that necessitated a fundamental revision of Labour’s priorities – in particular, a reduction of its 
emphasis on public ownership and of its identification with the working class, to enable it to win 
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support among a technical and managerial “salariat” whose electoral influence was widely 
discussed after 1959.97 
From 1959 “affluence” was also adopted in conservative commentary to denote Britain’s 
transition to an era of high mass consumption, a stage of capitalist development that was identified 
with economic modernity in the analyses of Galbraith and other American writers.98 This also 
supported the turn away from universal state welfare that Macmillan’s vague concept of “the 
opportunity state” had seemingly heralded. After the 1959 election the Bow Group began to 
advance the idea of “the post-Welfare State”, and in 1961 R.A. Butler publicly advocated “welfare 
through growth”, holding out the prospect that state welfare provision would be supplanted by 
expanding personal prosperity.99 The sense of widening disagreement over welfare policy was 
reinforced by Enoch Powell’s appointment as Minister of Health – which was actually welcomed 
in the New Statesman, on the grounds that it might dispel the myth of the two parties’ convergence 
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under the sign of “the Establishment”. 100  Before long Labour could also point to empirical 
evidence countering the idea of “the welfare state” as a transformative political and social 
settlement: the social worker Audrey Harvey’s study of poverty for the Fabian Society in 1960 
culminated with the observation that “We have been deluded into thinking […] that we have 
already achieved a Welfare State”, a formulation in which “Welfare State” signified a degree or 
standard of provision of which contemporary Britain fell short.101 Harvey’s study was reinforced 
by the “rediscovery of poverty” promoted by the sociologists Peter Townsend and Brian Abel-
Smith, and at the end of 1962 by the social scientist Richard Titmuss’s study of inequality in 
Britain, which concluded that “the present generation has been mesmerized by the language of ‘the 
Welfare State’”, and that the popular assumption that “after 1948 […] all the answers had been 
found to the problems of health, education, social welfare and housing” was erroneous.102 
Shortly after the 1959 election Titmuss had also developed a new analysis of power in 
Britain that centred upon a distinction between the “responsible”, or democratically-accountable, 
power of the nationalized industries and trade unions, and the “irresponsible” power of private 
business interests.103 This was partly a riposte to the idea of “the responsible society” which the 
Conservative “One Nation” group had promoted before the election, ostensibly as a via media 
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between the “extremes” of laissez-faire and socialism that would foster voluntaristic social action 
in civil society. 104  More importantly, however, Titmuss’s widely-adopted dichotomy tacitly 
defended the institutions of state created by Labour, and the unions, from the criticisms to which 
they had been subjected in 1959; while grounding the critical usages of “affluence” that were 
proliferating within the Labour Party upon a new analysis of economic power.105 The consumerist 
prosperity that Macmillan’s governments had appeared to celebrate in the 1959 election was 
already causing disquiet among some conservative commentators. The Spectator warned that it 
would undermine the principle of cohesion that rooted leadership and institutions within a healthy 
social organism and secured the proper functioning of what Fairlie and other conservative thinkers 
had previously referred to (in a positive sense) as “establishments”.106 This argument had been 
applied to Galbraith’s account of “affluence” in Crossbow just before the 1959 election, in an 
extended article by David Fairbairn warning that this new economic dispensation would create “a 
large genus of people whose roots go deep into no established pattern of living, who are 
uncommitted to any firmly held beliefs”.107 Fairbairn suggested that “affluence” in this sense 
would place excessive power in the hands of advertising and marketing interests, creating “an 
establishment whose aims […] run counter to those of society at large.”108 In other words, rather 
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than harmonising the interests of society in the way that quasi-Burkean usages of “the 
establishment” presupposed, this new “establishment” would enable a single section of the 
community to impose its interests on the whole, which Fairbairn therefore urged conservatives to 
forestall. 
 By early 1961 the problems posed by expanding consumption had also brought another 
balance-of-payments crisis into prospect. The Spectator began to advocate British entry into the 
European Economic Community as a way of averting “gradual political and economic decline” – 
a conceptualisation of British economic performance that new forms of economic measurement, 
and influential books by the financial journalists Andrew Shonfield and Michael Shanks, were 
helping to construct, in a sense broadly consistent with the analyses of economic performance that 
we have seen Wilson and Balogh had been developing since the late 1950s.109 In July 1961 Selwyn 
Lloyd announced a package of deflationary measures, the most notable of which was a “pay pause” 
for public sector workers which, insofar as it constituted an attempt to impose pay restraint without 
union support, ran counter to the claim that Utley and other conservative commentators had made 
since the late 1950s, that conservative government was uniquely capable of transforming the 
unions into “establishments”. This marked the point at which it was soon widely agreed that the 
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Government’s reputation for economic competence had been lost;110 but it was also the point at 
which the criticisms of economic policy and performance that Wilson and Balogh had been issuing 
since the mid-1950s gained wide credibility. This was partly because the “pay pause” constituted 
tacit recognition by the Government that some form of wage control was the prerequisite for 
continually rising mass consumption, while its attempt to impose such an arrangement without 
union support meant that the Conservative Party was no longer quite so obviously the most 
plausible agent of Britain’s transition into that economic future. A Spectator editorial criticised 
“Mr. Lloyd’s failure even to try to carry the trade unions with him”, and the paper’s City 
correspondent Nicholas Davenport lamented that Lloyd “chose to have an industrial war” in 
accordance with the preferred policy of “the Treasury establishment” – an adoption of the 
polemical usage that Balogh and Wilson had been deploying since the mid-1950s.111 That war was 
enthusiastically joined by Cousins, who scornfully rejected pay restraint at the 1961 Labour Party 
Conference. Meanwhile, the New Statesman gleefully pointed out that by antagonising “white-
collar” unions “the government is […] making itself enemies in precisely the social stratum where 
‘modern’ Conservatism won votes for Tory MPs.”112 
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 This sense of weakening support for the Government among the new middle class was also 
shared within the Conservative Party, as it became the target of new pejorative usages of “the 
Establishment” outside formal political commentary and debate. One of its newly-elected MPs, 
Charles Curran, warned Crossbow readers that the constraints upon its appeal to the “new” middle 
class included the fact that: 
 
The party sometimes conveys an impression that it is, in essence, a non-stop Old Boys 
reunion, conducted against a background of nannies, dorms, housemasters, pheasants, 
swords, and grandfathers who got themselves shot on the North-West Frontier as a prelude 
to immortality on the walls of Clifton Chapel.113 
 
This faintly comical admonition echoed the satirical revue Beyond the Fringe, which had opened 
in London in May 1961 shortly before the “pay pause” was announced, and whose most remarked-
upon features included Peter Cook’s impersonation of Harold Macmillan. The assimilation of this 
revue within political culture had become apparent within a month, when the Spectator reported 
that Macmillan’s “bumbling speech of welcome” on President Kennedy’s arrival in the UK was 
given “from notes, as if he were trying to parody Beyond the Fringe”.114 Later in the year Cook 
opened a nightclub for satirical comedy in Soho called “The Establishment”, which Jonathan 
Miller, another member of Beyond the Fringe, presented in The Observer as part of an assault on 
the overlapping networks of official and social power in which the norms of Victorian public-
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school culture prevailed.115  Meanwhile, the Conservatives’ loss of support among the “new” 
middle class was also a central motif in discussions of a “Liberal revival”, which were already 
current when The Establishment opened in Soho in October 1961 and which were seemingly 
corroborated in a run of by-elections the following year, in which the Liberals’ appeal as an anti-
“Establishment” or protest party was widely perceived to have worked against the 
Conservatives.116 
 The pay pause also heralded a shift in the Government’s approach to the role of the state 
in the economy that was difficult to accommodate within the parameters of a political appeal that 
had long been framed by the slogan “Conservative freedom works.”117 Shortly before the “pay 
pause” was announced the Conservative writer and politician Peter Goldman had claimed in a 
restatement of Conservative ideals that “Conservatives are the traditional foes of centralisation, 
the traditional champions of the diffusion of power”, and characterised “Socialism” as seeking “to 
expand the areas within which the gentleman in Whitehall is deemed to know best”.118 Shortly 
after the “pay pause” was announced Crossbow, edited at the time by Geoffrey Howe, warned that 
“Tories can no longer laugh off the need for economic planning by deriding Mr Douglas Jay’s 
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observation that ‘The gentleman in Whitehall knows best’.”119 The Government accordingly set 
up new institutional machinery for planning economic output and wages, and set in train many of 
the “modernising” reforms that were later pursued by Wilson’s Labour governments; but the 
weakness of those mechanisms, and particularly the T.U.C.’s refusal to join the National Incomes 
Council, enabled Labour to claim that it alone was capable of securing the unions’ co-operation in 
national economic management – that is, to identify itself with the political nation without 
appearing to sacrifice its radicalism.120 In October 1962 Wilson declared that the unions would 
refuse to support an incomes policy without (in effect) the adoption of Labour’s current fiscal 
policy; and claimed that the Government’s attempts at planning were insufficiently “dirigiste”, a 
term whose positive connotations at this stage mark a major shift from the political culture of the 
1950s.121 
However, Labour did not automatically benefit from the Government’s confrontation with 
the unions and what was believed to be its weakening appeal to the “new” middle class, partly 
because it was not itself altogether immune to the much-discussed Liberal revival.122 When Hugh 
Gaitskell sought to consolidate the internal unity of the Labour Party by announcing his opposition 
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to the Government’s EEC application in September 1962, the Conservative Party chairman Iain 
Macleod confidently predicted that it would cost Labour the next election, by alienating middle-
class voters who were presumed to support EEC entry. 123  Even when this prediction was 
confounded by de Gaulle’s veto of the application the following January, Harold Wilson—who 
became Labour leader in February 1963, after Gaitskell’s sudden death from lupus—faced what 
was thought to be the delicate strategic imperative of maintaining the fragile unity of the labour 
movement whilst securing support among the “new” middle class. The distinctive public doctrine 
that he articulated before the 1964 election was addressed to this apparent dilemma. Drawing 
together the conceptual resources that “affluence”, the rediscovery of poverty and Titmuss’s 
critique of “irresponsible” power had made available, Wilson’s rhetoric identified the 
Conservative Party with the vulgarised sense of “the Establishment” that was increasingly 
prevalent in popular culture, which he associated with privilege, amateurism, backwardness and, 
not infrequently, “effete”-ness – in contrast to the modernised polity he proposed to create through 
the incorporation of both the unions and the “new” technical and scientific middle class, freeing 
industry from the constraints supposedly imposed by traditional social elites. Wilson began 
developing this pattern of rhetorical contrasts shortly after his election as Labour leader, claiming 
amid the exposure of the Admiralty official John Vassall as a Soviet spy, for example, that “the 
gentlemanly posture of the Establishment” was no match for the “ruthless, highly professionalized” 
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Soviet security services.124 The scandal that was created over the Conservative minister John 
Profumo’s brief affair with Christine Keeler, with its origins at Cliveden and its suggestion of 
ruling-class social mores running counter to the national interest, evoked both the circumstances 
in which Fairlie was believed to have re-coined “the Establishment” in 1955 and the spectre of 
“the Cliveden set” to which the new concept had been related in its earliest uses. Yet the main 
elements of Wilson’s political appeal and his usage of “the Establishment” no longer relied upon 
their continuity with the vocabulary in which power and authority had been contested since the 
late 1930s, as initial pejorative usages of “the Establishment” in the mid-1950s had done. Instead, 
his celebrated speeches at the Labour Party conference of 1963 used “the Establishment” with 
distinctively contemporary meanings. His speech on foreign policy, for example, ridiculed the Earl 
of Home (then foreign secretary) as the representative of an “effete Establishment” and declared 
that: 
 
This country cannot put forth its true strength until it cuts out the dead wood at the top […] 
till it frees itself from the dead hands of the Establishment and the mesmerism of the old 
school tie, the nepotism and dynasticism which are as out of place in modern industry as 
they are in modern government.125 
 
The same themes were struck in Wilson’s oft-cited speech on “the scientific revolution” 
the following day, which derided “the old-boy network approach to life” and the continuing 
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influence in industry of “men whose only claim is their aristocratic connections or the power of 
inherited wealth or speculative finance”.126 On this latter point Wilson adopted a view of the 
integration of social elites and industrial leadership that was broadly consistent with the analyses 
of power undertaken by the New Left and contrary to Crosland’s opposing account, as well as to 
that given by the journalist Anthony Sampson in his influential book Anatomy of Britain (1962).127 
However, the plausibility of Wilson’s usage of “the Establishment” as Labour leader relied not 
upon its empirical accuracy, but upon its synthesis of the conceptual vocabulary that had emerged 
in Labour politics after the 1959 election, and upon its congruence with the new discursive 
template within which other forms of traditional authority—particularly that of the religious 
“Establishment”—were being called into question in 1963.128 It was undoubtedly reinforced by 
the accession of Home to the premiership in October that year, which Wilson greeted by 
demanding “How can a scion of an effete establishment appreciate and understand, above all read 
[sic] the scientific revolution, the mobilization of the skill and talents of all our people in the 
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struggle to restore Britain’s position in the world?”129 But it had already been formulated before 
that event, and was largely unaltered by it. 
Although Wilson’s politics was therefore directed against the idea of “the Establishment” 
in the particular usage of that term that he had developed, it was not anti-Establishment in the 
conventional, populist sense that had emerged in Labour commentary after Suez: he proposed to 
change the personnel and ethos of the British state, not to formally democratise it by preventing 
networks of power and influence from controlling its centre (except insofar as the unions 
constituted a locus of “responsible”, or democratically-accountable, power in the terms that 
Titmuss had influentially established). His proposal to integrate the trade unions more fully into 
national economic management was implicitly endorsed at the Trades Union Congress in 
September 1963, where a motion by the boilermakers’ union rejecting any form of wage restraint 
was accompanied by the observations of the Union’s general secretary as to the implacable 
opposition of Conservative governments to trade unions; by contrast, he declared, “if we have a 
Labour Government in power, and it wants assistance from our movement to achieve a planned 
economy, I shall be one of the first in this room to pledge my support.”130 At the Labour Party 
conference the following month, union leaders re-stated their opposition to wage restraint under a 
future Labour government, but the amity between the party and the unions was repeatedly 
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emphasised.131 Just under a year later, Wilson launched Labour’s general election campaign with 
a speech at the Trades Union Congress at Brighton, which included a passing reference to “the 
complacent mythology of the Establishment” concerning the possibility of increasing exports 
without planning.132 By now this aspect of Wilson’s rhetoric had become characteristic, and its  
effectiveness was ruefully acknowledged by conservative commentators.133 The final pre-election 
issue of Crossbow carried a review of anthologies of speeches by Wilson and Home, which 
complained that Wilson “repeatedly attacks the Tories as upholding a quite fictional ‘Edwardian 
establishment mentality’”.134 (Since “the Establishment” itself appeared only twice in the book in 
question, this complaint suggests how closely associated with Wilson the term had already 
become.)135 But the fictionality of Wilson’s usage of this term did not diminish its semantic force; 
and there may have been some acknowledgement of this in the same reviewer’s only-partially-
disparaging statement that Wilson “is equally persuasive at first glance and specious at second”.136 
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VI 
 
Wilson continued to pursue this rhetorical strategy after Labour’s narrow victory in 1964 in order 
to maintain his government’s radical credentials. At the Labour Party conference the following 
year he declared that the election had been, among other things, “a decision that […] every aspect 
of our national life that has been corrupted by the doctrine of a self-perpetuating establishment, 
should give way to a more open society where knowing your job would mean more than knowing 
the right people.”137 Meanwhile, he attempted to make good on his implicit promise to incorporate 
organised labour into the polity by giving ministerial office to Frank Cousins, and by restoring the 
legal immunities that had been taken from the unions in the Rookes v. Barnard judgement of 1964. 
(Introducing the latter measure in the House of Commons, the Minister of Labour reflected that 
“There were few half a century ago who believed that the trade union movement would become 
almost a part of the Establishment”, a development which he claimed would produce “greater 
efficiency and greater order” – a marked contrast with the sense in which we have seen the unions 
were accused of complicity with “the Establishment” in Labour commentary during the mid-
1950s.) 138  Wilson’s self-presentation was sufficiently credible for the Observer’s political 
correspondent to describe him, in favourable contrast to the newly-elected Conservative leader 
Edward Heath, as having “refused either to adapt his way of life or personal standards to fit into 
the establishment pattern”; even The Times, whose political correspondent by contrast implied that 
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Heath’s election to the leadership had invalidated the association of the Conservative Party with 
“the Establishment” that Wilson had successfully employed, described the preparation of the 
National Plan as having been “surrounded by a hostile Whitehall establishment.”139 Yet even 
before the 1966 election the idea of “the Establishment” began to be directed against Wilson by 
critics who claimed that, in office, his radicalism had fallen short of his rhetoric. Just before polling 
day, The Guardian’s financial editor accused the Labour Party of “behaving like the Establishment” 
insofar as Wilson and other party leaders appeared to “feel compelled to stick to relatively 
meaningless phrases” in the election campaign.140 This usage was adopted in 1966-67 by the self-
identifying “Left” of the party, and by proponents of the modernising socialism with which Wilson 
had aligned himself before the 1964 election.141 (The concept of “affluence” was likewise turned 
against Wilson by his avowedly “socialist” critics at around the same time.)142 Wilson himself may 
have helped to validate this critique by his presentation of the seamen’s strike of 1966 as a 
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confrontation between the unions and the state, which prompted Cousins to resign.143 Amid the 
tacit abandonment of the National Plan that ensued, the credibility of Wilson’s promise to create 
a new polity was severely diminished. 
Meanwhile the idea of “the Establishment” acquired other meanings that were applied to a 
wider range of targets. The term was adopted by Heath’s conservative critics to indicate that his 
policies conformed too closely to those of the Labour government – particularly after Enoch 
Powell’s infamous speech on immigration in 1967 created an issue around which an ostensibly 
popular conservatism could be defined.144 Powell, The Times’s economics editor Peter Jay wrote 
in May 1968, “is now a major political phenomenon. He is seen by many as making a bid for 
power over the heads of the political establishment direct to the people”, in opposition to “the 
illusion-ridden, bi-partisan consensus of the past few years.”145 By then the idea of a “new” or 
“progressive establishment” was also gaining currency among critics of the social and cultural 
processes of the 1960s, which in its adoption by conservative commentators could imply a kind of 
usurpation of the authority exercised by “establishments” in the proper sense, threatening the 
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integrity of the nation as a moral community.146 Amid these discussions of a “new Establishment” 
loosely associated with the Labour governments, the idea that Labour was becoming the “natural 
party of government” also entered political discourse. 147  Pimlott claims that Wilson himself 
adopted this phrase in 1969, in which context it supported his claim to the political “centre” and 
underpinned his attempts to reform trade union law through the White Paper In Place of Strife, by 
identifying the Government’s proposals with the national interest.148 After the proposals were 
effectively rejected by the unions, the phrase could also tacitly rebut suggestions that the incident 
demonstrated the Government’s inability to govern, and buttress Wilson’s demands for party 
discipline – much as descriptions of Labour as an “alternative government” had done in the 
1950s.149 
It could also still evoke a sense that Labour was uniquely competent to manage a quasi-
corporatist polity with the unions, for as long as the “social contract” under which the miners’ 
strike was ended in 1974 continued to function.150 However, the risks of this rhetorical strategy 
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became evident at the Conservative Party conference of 1975 when, as more conventional 
politicians contested Wilson’s claim that Labour was “the natural party of government”, the party’s 
new leader actually endorsed it.151 “If we are to be told that a Conservative Government could not 
govern because certain extreme leaders would not let it”, Margaret Thatcher declared, “then 
General Elections are a mockery and we’ve arrived at the one party state, and parliamentary 
democracy in this country will have perished.”152 This opened the way to Thatcher’s usage of “the 
Establishment”, in the sense of a “left-socialist oligarchy restraining the natural acquisitiveness of 
‘free-born’ Britons”, as it has been described.153  Of course the actual arrangements whereby 
Wilson could claim to be making Labour the “natural party of government” were more precarious 
than Thatcher made them sound, but the significance of her re-positioning was instantly recognised 
by contemporaries. “No part of her speech”, the political editor of The Times stated immediately 
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afterwards, “had deeper political significance than her challenge to Mr Wilson’s claim […] that 
Labour, underpinned by trade union power, is now the natural party of government.”154 
It has been argued that a transition took place in British politics during or after the 1970s, 
wherein the traditional opposition of “conservatism” and “socialism” was supplanted by more 
complex clusters of ideas loosely bound together within “New Rights and Lefts”. 155  This 
development can also be situated within a wider international transition away from what has been 
called “the grand dichotomy of the twentieth century”, as the political alignments that previously 
cohered under the labels “left” and “right” fragmented from the late 1960s as a corollary of, 
respectively, identity politics and new social movements, and the contradictory impulses of neo-
liberal political economy.156 The history traced in this article suggests that an important transition 
in political argument became evident in Britain during that period, but that it had begun during the 
1950s and early 1960s and that it was associated with a new conceptual vocabulary of which “the 
Establishment” was a central component. The close analysis of that concept which this article has 
presented suggests that the political economy and institutions that emerged from the 1940s did not 
appear as a stable or finished settlement to more than a few political actors and commentators; and 
that contestations of the scope and implications of the reforms of that decade effected what we 
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might advisedly call a reconstruction of political argument in Britain, the effects of which became 
evident after 1964. Reading political argument in this way deepens our understanding of the 
process whereby ideas and alignments began to fall across the issues that had historically 
structured the polarities of “left” and “right” in Britain, slightly preceding the electorate’s 
diminishing recognition of those terms that was identified in political science at the end of the 
1960s.157 The debates over power and authority which the idea of “the Establishment” helped to 
structure from the mid-1950s do not easily fit within this traditional conceptualisation of political 
space; and the common advocacy of “planning” and of state involvement in the economy after 
July 1961 between the Conservative and Labour parties likewise suggests a blurring of the 
distinction between the political “left” and “right” as it had been constructed over at least the 
previous decade or so. The closely-related opposition between “modern-minded” and “old-
fashioned” political appeals during the early 1960s also appeared to supplant a traditional “left/ 
right” dichotomy, in ways that The Economist explicitly recognised immediately after the 1966 
election.158 
This change in the terms of political debate, prior to the class and partisan “dealignment” 
of the electorate during the 1970s, was one of which Wilson attained a temporary mastery during 
the early 1960s through his use of “the Establishment.”159 That mastery proved unsustainable in 
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office, however, and the suspicion of the state’s neutrality that Wilson’s radical critics began using 
“the Establishment” to express gave rise to new forms of anti-bureaucratic, voluntarist political 
action during the late 1960s and early 1970s, which were eventually undone by their own aversion 
to hierarchical leadership.160 Yet the place of conservatism in the new political dispensation was 
also highly ambiguous. The economic and social policies pursued by the Thatcher administrations 
stood in an uneasy relationship to a conservatism that rooted political institutions within a densely-
structured ethical order, which we have seen was discussed in terms of “establishments” during 
the early 1960s.161 More importantly, we have also seen here that one ideal of conservative politics 
which “the Establishment” was used to promote in post-war Britain envisaged programmatic 
government action giving way to a restoration of the balance between contending forces and 
interests, which was conceived as the natural condition of the “nation” as a cohesive political 
community. Thatcher’s adoption, as Conservative leader, of an anti-“Establishment” appeal 
explicitly opposed to what she portrayed as the prevailing political settlement arguably marked its 
abandonment, as Utley himself appears to have recognised.162 In this way, the ideal of conservative 
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government that Utley and others had once used “the Establishment” to convey was marginalised 
in British political culture, by a complex of intellectual and political developments which shifting 
usages of that term itself helped to promote. 
 The formation and development of the concept of “the Establishment” is therefore a central 
part of the history of political argument in Britain since 1945. From its initial re-coining in 
conservative commentary during the 1950s, the diverse usages of the term were part of a vigorous 
contestation of power and authority in post-war Britain, the scope and purposes of which are 
brought into focus when the concept is properly historicised. As we have seen here, most of those 
usages were developed in answer to the vexed question of what kind of polity had emerged from 
the 1940s, and the extent of the transformation that had been wrought over the decade during which 
it became conventional to refer to Britain as a “welfare state”. The current article suggests that the 
transition of this term from an actor’s to an historian’s category also requires greater critical 
scrutiny than it has hitherto received: as other historians have pointed out, conceptions of post-war 
Britain as a “welfare state” conceal the actual configuration of interests and resources within the 
state apparatus. 163  Moreover, the uses of “the Establishment” that have been examined here 
indicate that the “welfare state” in Britain was not a stable political settlement, but a term that was 
applied to a set of policies and institutions which were less complete and coherent than it made 
them appear. Distinguishing between the development of those policies and institutions, and the 
vocabulary in which their scope and significance was contested, therefore appears as a 
fundamental requirement for understanding British politics during the twentieth century. 
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